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Abstract This article discusses trust and its evident crisis
with a particular focus on the education system (1). Subse-
quently, the function of trust in the complex knowledge-based
society is highlighted (2). Using implementation of evidence-
based governance in education as an example, this paper
shows how social complexity increases by linking several
partial systems (3). This is followed by a discussion of some
perspectives on how these combinations can be interpreted
with regard to trust (4). Finally, aspects of future theoretical
and empirical analysis of trust in applied social science edu-
cational research will be outlined (5).
Keywords Trust . Mistrust . Evidence-based governance
within the education system
Introduction: trust in the knowledge-based society
In this paper we will highlight the increasing uncertainty
concerning the education system’s performance under the
conditions of a knowledge-based society. In our discussion
the notion of a knowledge-based society is treated as a general
concept which highlights an important trend of current social
change. As uncertainty causes the implementation of diverse
control systems, we argue that in an era of evidence-based
education, general trust in education might be accompanied or
even substituted by mistrust. Trust is considered an essential
societal resource and crucial for the existence and welfare of
nations. Subsequently, diminishing trust in central institutions
such as education would affect society as a whole. Therefore,
we pose trust as a desired theoretical and empirical research
issue in future research.
The starting point of our discussion is the increasing un-
certainty existing in today’s society. This uncertainty is diag-
nosed and labelled as a knowledge-based society. On the one
hand, this description of the present denotes the dependence
on knowledge. On the other hand, it also refers to the fact that
the production of knowledge simultaneously produces igno-
rance. This could potentially block communication, decision-
making and action-taking. This is because the continuously
growing amount of knowledge, as well as the lack of knowl-
edge, increases the complexity of societal structures. Using
the education system as an example, we will illustrate the
complexity of societal structures. Within this societal subsys-
tem we can observe a continual linkage of policy, science and
education – a process labelled as ‘evidence-based education’.
Under the conditions of interwoven societal subsystems, it is
assumed that the need for trust escalates. Trust is considered a
special technique; a bridge between knowledge and igno-
rance. In other words, it is needed in cases where knowledge
is lacking. Furthermore, trust is seen as risky as it is based on
the assumption that the counterpart will honour one’s expec-
tations. Adjustments are made in advance, thereby facilitating
present action. It is out of this assumption and its correspond-
ing adjustments (which can only be appraised in the future),
that the perception of risk is borne.
Luhmann [1] – one of the pioneering and key contributors
in present day discussions of trust – argued that trust is an
important means of facing the uncertainty of complexity. This
uncertainty results from the problem of double contingency.
Double contingency emerges in every social situation as in the
most basic one, namely in interaction between alter and ego.
Both are black boxes for each other because they cannot know
what the other is really up to. They can only make assumptions
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based on attempts to understand what the other’s intentions
could be. The ongoing assumption amounts to a complexity
which inhibits both communication and the undertaking of
action. Under these circumstances, by directing expectations
and attention trust reduces this basic complexity and absorbs
uncertainty [ibid.]. In the face of deficient knowledge about
future events and situations, it enables actors to be confident of
success even if there is no guarantee [2: 265]. In addition to
this, trust also has an affective component and especially an
action-related one [3]. Trust provides a sense of certainty and
creates a sense of coherence, so that communication, decision-
making and action-taking are possible. This is owing to the fact
that trust-givers, despite uncertain knowledge about the future,
still assume that their expectations will be fulfilled. Trust is a
means by which people can react to basic uncertainty. Due to
the unpredictable nature of other’s actions, this basic uncer-
tainty can also take on the form of a danger of failure. This
danger can then turn into risk [1]. Thus, danger has by no
means been eliminated, but becomes limited due to observable,
explicit expectations as expressed as trust [4: 370]. However in
our complex modern society trust between people is no longer
sufficient. Instead social complexity can only be sufficiently
reduced by trust in the system(s), and more importantly, in
organisations.
In modern, quickly changing social formations, trust is
considered to be the foundation that supports them as well as
the glue that holds them together [2, 5, 6]. However, interna-
tional surveys show that the population’s general trust in public
institutions is showing signs of decline [7–10]. This also
applies to institutions within the educational systems: Based
on Gallup data, in the U.S. education system a trust crisis
towards schools was identified as early as the 1990s [11]. This
trust crisis was attributed to the ethnical composition of classes
at school. Parents worried that their own children’s individual
academic performance was suffering due to the increasing
proportion of children from immigrant families [12]. It was
found that because of this worry parents sent their children to
other schools, in particular private schools, where classes were
more ethnically homogenous. Guppy and Davies [13, 14] also
used the Gallup surveys to show that the time between the
1940s and the end of the 1980s was marked by a persistent loss
of trust in the public education system. This loss of trust was
primarily indicated by the growing number of pupils in private
education. In contrast to Hagerty [11], Guppy and Davies [13]
assumed the cause for the loss of trust to be the reforms in
education that were taking place at that time.
Today reforms in education systems, out of all of the
educational organizations, happen across all developed states.
A general mistrust in their performance was already revealed
by some studies. These are part of an evidence-based gover-
nance. This governance is the political means to solve the
increasing uncertainty in society with the help of indicator-
driven surveys. However, evidence-based governance alone
does not solve the problem. Moreover, it produces uncertainty
concerning the performance of educational organisations and
systems, as well as the validity of assumptions about the
capability of modern well-fare states’ institutions.
So far, there are few studies that explicitly address trust in
the education system. Furthermore, these studies arise from
diverse sources. Based on representative SOEP data, Schupp
and Wagner [15] showed that 49 % of the people interviewed
had ‘very much’ or ‘quite a lot of’ trust in the German
education system. By contrast, on the basis of a qualitative
study, the Bertelsmann Foundation [16] reported that trust in
public institutions in Germany was in a crisis which extended
to the education system. This corresponds with data presented
by the opinion research institute Ipsos [17]. This study showed
that only a quarter of the population has trust in the German
education system.1
In light of such findings it becomes understandable why
there is discussion about a trust crisis [6, 21–23]. What does
this notion mean, how did this problem occur, and why is the
solution of evidence-based governance a part of the problem?
Outlining such questions we would like to suggest trust as an
important research issue for future research.
Trust as ameans to absorb uncertainty in complex systems
Knowledge and ignorance in complex systems
Beside uncontrollable risks, the identification of present soci-
ety as “knowledge-based” [24, 25] denotes a view of society
which is increasingly gaining in complexity. This is because
ignorance, risks, loss of expert authority [26: 21] or uncertain-
ty as to how to use knowledge are spreading at the same time
[27, 28]. A characteristic feature of the knowledge-based
society is its differentiation into diverse, functional subsys-
tems and the increasing interdependence between them [29].
Furthermore, the borders between the different subsystems are
frequently crossed [28: 155], because, among other things,
many different actors from diverse fields take part in generat-
ing knowledge [30]. The reason behind this is the endeavour
to prevent unintended consequences of the application of
knowledge via a regulatory knowledge policy [28: 109].
In addition to the regulatory knowledge policy one can also
observe a reflexive knowledge policy. The reflexive knowl-
edge policy discusses the newly developing orders of knowl-
edge by taking a critical look at the intentions and practices of
the actors involved in the production of knowledge [31:
699 f.]. This shows clearly that the knowledge-based society
1 Besides this, educational reports also point to the socially unequal
distribution of trust [18, 19], according to which interpersonal trust is
greater between highly educated people, between people with higher
incomes, between women and elderly [18: 171 ff.; also [20].
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is seen as a system in which knowledge is the central axis of
maintaining and developing it. Knowledge is seen as symbolic
capital and as an essential resource that enables actors to shape
and participate in societal developments. Nevertheless,
knowledge is distributed unequally in society. Therefore, in
the course of the discussion of the emerging knowledge-based
society, discourses about knowledge economy or cognitive
capitalism are also raised [29, 32, 33]. If trust is seen as
Simmel views it [2], as an intermediate state between knowl-
edge and ignorance, it can be regarded as crucial capital that
may provide those institutions (which are basically trusted)
with room for manoeuvre. This capital allows for opportuni-
ties to change plans and tactics which might otherwise remain
barred.2
The fragility of trust
Trust as a risky means for reduction of complexity
The increasing unpredictability and complexity in the knowl-
edge-based society demand an opposite pole. This is why
generalized trust or trust in the system (meaning the kind of
trust displayed towards experts, people in certain capacities or
organisations [35: 84] is seen as one of the constitutive ele-
ments of modern society [1, 6].
However trust is as fragile as it is essential [1]. Trust is
essential because it is a fundamental element of systems. It
allows things to be done that are seemingly impossible in a
climate of mistrust [6: 99]. With this in mind, in the following
we will discuss the various measures taken to establish com-
prehensive monitoring circles. This discussion pertains to
measures which are presently being set up in the education
system. The usefulness and benefit of these measures are still
open at the point of set-up, though it remains unclear whether
the time and effort invested in setting them up are justified. At
the same time trust is fragile. It is easily damaged by dashed
expectations and can only very slowly be stabilized or
regained by convincing measures.
Fundamentally, trust is described as a multi-factor process:
“Someone has trust in something, in some respect and under
certain conditions” [36: 8]. This description shows that trust in
complex situations is not only necessary but complex in its
own right [37]. One must take action at the present time,
assuming an optimistic view of the future, although future
events are unpredictable. The recipient of trust has many
different options, but trust as a pre-condition of action is
focused on one of these possibilities only, and thus limits
expectations accordingly. This is why trust can be disappoint-
ed so easily and is quickly damaged. It is, furthermore, at risk
since the inclination to have trust is a very gradual process.
Seen from a factual point of view, trust can be understood as a
form of expectation based on information from the past. This
information is projected into the future while taking effect in
the present [1]. From a social point of view, trust can be
understood as the result of observation.
Increasing complexity through mistrust
The following discusses the issue of generalized trust in times
of knowledge-based governance in the education system. In
the coming passages, we can record an increase in complexity
from a) a factual, b) a social and c) a temporal point of view.
Beginning with the factual level, this was not the only level on
which a comprehensive education monitoring structure was
adopted. Executing a comprehensive education monitoring
system includes the use of a great number of instruments for
generating knowledge (e.g. comparative testing, inspections,
indicator-based educational reports, etc.). At the same time,
socially this is accompanied by new organisations in the
education system, e.g. organisations that will develop and
implement knowledge generating instruments will be respon-
sible for communicating the knowledge gained. Addressing
the temporal perspective, the dissemination of information
through mass media creates a delay in the formation of
knowledge. However, the use of instruments, the existence
of educational monitoring institutions as well as media reports
of findings might defeat the intended aim. Moreover, mistrust
could be fostered instead.
Mansell [38] and Murphy [39], for example, estimate that
the accuracy and appropriateness of the media reports will be
crucial for the acceptance of investigation results. Moreover,
they will be essential for the trust in the studies and the action
taken as a result of them. Endreß [40, 41] assumes that even
long-standing tacit trust that is firmly established can become
brittle and reflexive through confusing or disturbing informa-
tion, ultimately turning into mistrust. Accordingly, we think
that the trust engaged in the education system up to that point
was then undermined, for example, by media reports of be-
low-average achievements of pupils [42: 493, 14]: As a result,
there are now sound empirical indications that the implicit
trust granted for years in the education system’s capability
might have been unjustified. Although this has yet to be
empirically proven, it is plausible, at least from a theoretical
perspective, to assume a loss of trust. This is because “trust is a
peculiar belief predicated not on evidence but on the lack of
contrary evidence” [43: 234]. However, if there is evidence of
poor performance of the education system, it is hard to look
confidently at the possibility of improvement. In a similar
way, O’Neill [44] also points to the risk resulting from the
introduction of the new instruments of governance: “An
associated risk is that accountability can be a source rather
than a remedy for distrust” [ibid.: 10]. But if once trust has
been damaged, it takes a long time to establish it anew.
2 Even the prosperity of enterprises is based on (interpersonal) trust. Trust
does grow if the enterprises are successful [5, 34].
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Furthermore, in order to do so complexity increases. This is
because generally measures, organisations and actors are
required. Examples of this might be knowledge brokers
who act as intermediaries between scientists and politicians,
or instruments with which the education system’s capability
can be systematically monitored and checked.
In terms of reducing complexity by observing others for the
sake of finding further justification, mistrust is equivalent to
trust. However, mistrust makes successful communication and
cooperation with others more unlikely. If trust has been di-
minished it requires enormous efforts to be regained, as it is a
struggle against the persistent tendencies of mistrust. This
cannot be achieved without external control mechanisms.
However, these control mechanisms inevitably lead to in-
creased social complexity. This will be demonstrated in the
following using evidence-based governance in the education
system as an example. Henceforth both the linking of the
various systems as well as the institutionalization of check-
ups will be evaluated in greater depth.
Trust and structural linkage
It is typical for the knowledge-based society that several
societal functional systems are linked [27: 33]. In this paper
we focus on the combination of education with science and
politics in the context of the evolving evidence-based gover-
nance in education. The phenomenon of the scientification of
educational policies, where governance depends on evidence,
is an indication of the linking of subsystems. Further linkages
become apparent in the politicization of science, where spe-
cific knowledge about education is made available. Science
generates instrumental knowledge. On the one hand it is used
by politicians to solve problems, as is the case here, in the field
of education. On the other hand it can be used to legitimize
educational policy decisions as well. That is to say, politics are
in charge of the resources for science as well as their institu-
tional protection [ibid. 27 f.]. This is because the diagnoses
and needs in the field of education provide legitimization of
political control and agenda-setting in scientific research. An-
alytically, the matching of services or the mutual dependence
of subsystems on each other cannot be perceived as dissolving
borders between them. Rather, this can be seen as an act of
structural pairing.
According to system theory each functionally distin-
guished system has its own individual communication code.
In the system of education the code is communicable/non-
communicable, in the scientific system it is true/false and in
the political system it is power/powerless (or opposing). Due
to the semantic differences in the specific codes, (which serve
as the bases for internal communications within the functional
subsystems), respective subsystems are regarded as operative-
ly locked. At the same time they are open to information.
Thus, not only are they able to communicate with one another,
they also selectively allow themselves to be irritated by each
other [1: 100 ff.].
Problem and solution part I: linking through mechanisation
The thesis states that linking diverse subsystems which have
been carried out in the field of education and induced by
evidence-based governance has been made possible by tech-
nological advances. These have taken place through the im-
plementation of new governance mechanisms. While the sci-
entific system is mechanised through “certain methods” [45:
70], the political system is mechanised, among other things,
through the return to technocracy [46]. In the education sys-
tem, the complex forms of the new governance model are
being imposed on education to revise the interaction mecha-
nisms on the organisational and system’s level that have been
deemed deficient [47]. If it is true that the aforementioned
functional systems are becoming mechanised, the structural
linking will ensure that relevant information will be translated
quickly and appropriately from code to code. Could trust and
mistrust in the mechanisms be seen as a quasi-universal com-
munication code through which mechanised systems are
linked to one another? Weingart [27] takes a similar stance
with his view: the (side-) effects of linkages in the science
system are actually changes in the mechanism of self-control
and legitimization. These undermine the originally existing
trust and, as a consequence, demand external agents in order
to regain the damaged trust [ibid.: 32]. This process is
regarded as the establishment of control systems and mecha-
nisms. These forms of social mechanisation generate informa-
tion which, seen from a system-specific point of view, is being
used as knowledge for regulative purposes. However, when
these mechanisms generate information they also depend on
the trust of all relevant parties.
Theoretical opinions differ regarding the evaluation of the
relationship between check and control mechanisms and trust.
On the one hand, it is assumed that check and control mech-
anisms are interlaced with trust and thus are not mutually
exclusive. Möllering [48], however, believes in the duality
rather than the dualism of check and control mechanisms and
trust. According to him, the check and control mechanism of a
systemmay be the prerequisite of trust and, in turn, the trust in
the system may encourage the trust in its checks and control.
Indeed, a system is trusted because it provides mechanisms of
checks and control. By extension, the control mechanisms are
also trusted [see also 49, 50]. Nooteboom [36] arranges trust
and checks and control in a time sequence by assuming that
trust becomes necessary when checks and control end [ibid.:
4]. Luhmann [1], in contrast, expresses a more radical view by
saying that the transparency created through checks and con-
trol does not require trust at all. If, on the other hand, checks
and control are taken as statements of mistrust, they gain,
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according to Luhmann [ibid.: 113], a system-stabilising func-
tion: “Whether systems are trusted … may … decisively
depend on whether trust is suspended at critical points and
mistrust is applied”.3 With regard to trust towards institutions,
Shapiro [50] argues that the checks and control of these insti-
tutions might set off a spiral of mistrust [ibid.: 652]. On the
other hand, trust and checks and control are regarded as com-
patible with each other. Hartmann [37], for example, assumes
that those who have trust do not need monitoring and control
and will do without. Luhmann [1: 26] says that it is contradic-
tory “to the function and style of trust to demand or offer
detailed factual information and expert proof” [see also 4].
However, if trust alone is no longer sufficient, and if the
complex conditions must be stabilized through checks and
control, this kind of dealing with contingency may, in the
end, undermine trust. Checks and control primarily do not
generate trust, but rather transparency. It is a means of creating
knowledge, which replaces trust. Trust changes the focus and
directs it towards the instruments of checks and control. How
can the structural linkage between related partial systems be
upheld under these circumstances? What other informational
translations are taking effect here?
Problem and solution part II: “evidence-based governance” as
generative metaphor
In the knowledge-based society, knowledge becomes an essen-
tial resource of education governance. At the same time, knowl-
edge is unequally distributed between the conflicting poles of
politics, economics and science [51–53]. Besides giving edu-
cational policy-making this new specific foundation, evidence-
based governance also leads to educational policy becoming
more scientific. Due to the fact that evidence is processed by the
media much more than before, this tendency towards a scien-
tific character corresponds to the communization of decisions.
This communication of decisions leads then to specific trust-
figurations. In former times these started from trust in external
sources and then came to interpersonal and professional trust.
By now, also trust against expert systems and their instruments
of control as well as their mechanisms to produce knowledge is
common [54, 55]. From this it follows that communization and
gaining more scientific attributes are related to each other in
terms of performance. Consequently, in the following ‘evi-
dence-based governance’ is to be regarded as a generative met-
aphor which can guide the translation from one code to another,
thus offering a different kind of connection between the
subsystems.
A generative metaphor is to be understood as a figurative
description of social situations. This description serves to both
help pre-interpret problem situations as well as provide
preformed solutions to them [56]. Because they are open to
multiple interpretations, fundamentally this makes them good
connectors in communication. Furthermore, such metaphors
can be regarded as soft governance instruments, which are
used to try and influence recipients in a targeted way [57: 139,
141].
If the figure of the generative metaphor is transferred to the
current dominate forms of governance of education systems, an
interesting picture crystallizes. A few years after the PISA
shock,4 comprehensive monitoring systems were installed in
many countries [59]. The aim was to detect shortcomings in the
education system in order to improve its performance. This was
undertaken through, for example, competence tests, compara-
tive testing, quality control and school inspections. This is called
“evidence-based governance” of the education system [45, 60,
61]. Understood as a generative metaphor, the notion of evi-
dence-based governance points to the problem that education
policy has essentially been acting without substance thus far.
Therefore this is a policy which is responsible, for example, for
the bad PISA results. Conversely, this metaphor suggests that
these problems could be solved by falling back on tried and
tested knowledge. Furthermore the education system could be
directed through politically determined stipulations. According
to this, the re-assuring use of the term of evidence-based gover-
nance goes along with performance [62: 21 ff.]: In order for
knowledge to gain the attractive label of “evidence”, conditions
must be created that will allow the creation of comprehensive
monitoring systems as well as making “certain methods” hege-
monic [45]. In this sense the metaphor of evidence-based gov-
ernance can be understood as the cognitive instrument [63:
55 ff.] of a specific politics to gain insight [64] or a knowledge
policy [31]. This makes it possible to establish “numerocratic
rules” [65: 174]. It is within these rules (using the supposedly
neutral methods and instruments of a “governance by numbers”)
[66–68], that political, economic or social factual targets are to
be achieved [69: 75]. This is made possible by the deeply
ingrained social trust in numbers and figures [70, 71].5
However, the development of evidence-based governance
does not only seem to increase knowledge about education. It
also appears to be accompanied by increased media attention
to the education system or rather, its deficiencies. This is
precisely the sense of the aforementioned characteristic of
“communization of scientific knowledge”. According to
Luhmann [74], it can be assumed, that most of what we know
about the education system, as about everything else, we have
learned from the media. The latter plays a significant role and
3 This and the following quotes of Luhmann [1] are our own translations.
4 These results were not surprising. As early as in the 1960s Picht [58]
talked about the “German education catastrophe”. Subsequently, educa-
tional policy up into the 1990s was focused increasingly on economic
considerations. It is especially apparent in the introduction of the new
governance model, in the context of which the participation in PISA can
also be seen as rational.
5 But possibly because of this process and the seemingly undeniable
evidence by numbers trust is met with scepticism [72, 73].
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carries significant responsibility concerning knowledge and
ignorance about the education system and its capability. How-
ever, media reports about research results in the field of
education are by no means unbiased. Murphy [39], for exam-
ple, shows how the media influences public understanding of
education by their tendentious information about the national
examination results in the UK. The media accomplishes this by
using a limited repertoire of “structural, narrative and presenta-
tion templates” [ibid.: 144]. This is problematic especially
because “educational assessment results are… a brand which
depends very much on the confidence of the consumer” [ibid.:
142]. If data is used selectively or manipulatory – whether by
the media or politics – it can, quite probably, have an impact on
the loss of trust in the education system. In regards to the British
school system, according to Mansell [38], it bears the risk that
“parents might lose confidence in schools as a result of being
misled about what is known about reading standards” [ibid.:
131]. It is maybe for this reason as well that public institutions
are endeavouring to stabilize the trust in the reliability of their
findings about the education system [75, 76].
By reverse logic this means if there is no longer trust in the
assessment of the education system, it could result in people
having no trust in individual organizations. Moreover, the
instruments used to gain the results reported in the media
and used by politics might lose their legitimacy. To a certain
degree, it is suggested that reported results are connected with
trust in the education system.
This connection between trust and the instruments of new
governance can be seen from two different sides. On the one
hand, it could be argued that the instruments of new governance
are replacing the formerly existing trust. On the other hand, the
very fact that new instruments of governance have been intro-
duced may be seen as an indication that trust has been damaged
and must now be regained [77]. Therefore, trust or rather dam-
aged trust can be regarded as a condition for the introduction of
monitoring instruments. Conversely, it can be understood as the
result of the reports of findings generated by these instruments.
As shown in the following section, from a theoretical point
of view both perspectives are quite plausible. However, no
matter which perspective is applied, the connection between
trust and evidence-based governance is precarious. In the
knowledge-based society, there is an ever increasing depen-
dence on expert knowledge and thus an increasing need for
trust in expert systems. Simultaneously, this trust is growing
fragile and appears to be headed towards a crisis.
Erosion of trust or shifting of trust?
The introduction of new governance instruments bears the
dilemma that the complexity originally reduced through trust
will at least temporarily increase again. This is because in
order to regain trust a “new” complexity must be set up, which
in turn will have to be reduced again. In this way, the above-
mentioned organisations and knowledge brokers (which are
meant to ensure the credibility of tests and test results) in-
crease complexity. These measures remain risky in so far as it
remains unclear whether they can fulfil their function and
succeed in stabilizing trust. In order to determine in what
way the introduction of new governance instruments are rel-
evant to trust, the risks entailed in them must be considered.
Risks might be the high costs incurred by the introduction
while at the same time there is uncertainty as to how to
translate the findings generated.Moreover, it may be uncertain
as to whether any improvements to the problematic issues
would actually be achieved. Risks also exist in: possible
resistance to the introduction of the instruments, the great
expenditure of time as well as in the fact that results will be
documented and communicated even if they do not fulfil
expectations [36]. The question that arises now from all this
is whether one should assume that this constitutes an erosion
of trust and/or a development of mistrust.
Trust and mistrust
There are different opinions about what the proportional rela-
tionship between trust and mistrust is. It may be that: a) trust
and mistrust replace each other; or b) trust and mistrust might
complement each other or actually occur at the same time, in
the sense that both forms of complexity reduction coexist. A
further perspective to complete this picture is the thesis that we
support in this paper, namely that c) trust in organisations and
actors is being shifted to instruments of checks and control.
Trust and mistrust as mutually exclusive – or: erosion of trust
as the driving force of growing mistrust?
If one regards trust andmistrust as two sides of a coin, it stands
to reason that if trust diminishes, mistrust will grow. This
could also be described as a reciprocal relationship.
This is the position one will find if one says that trust is
being replaced by something else. For example, trust can be
replaced by checks and controls or accountability, as it is
happening in connection with the new governance in the
education system. Pechar [78] rather pointedly characterizes
the development of demands for accountability in higher
education and research policy as the replacement of what used
to be advanced trust. This is also noticeable in other areas of
education. For example, in pre-school institutions, language
learning diaries and education plans have been introduced.
Schools are subject to inspections, and lessons are designed to
meet educational standards. The results of these lessons are
obtained through competence tests, and in institutes for con-
tinuing education competence passes are issued and quality
tests carried out. In universities in particular evaluations of
courses and instructors are taking place. Indeed, in all areas of
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education, introducing and executing accountability in the
course of the new governance is interlocked with the estab-
lishment of quality development, quality control and quality
management systems. Along the same lines, Codd [79: 45 ff]
describes quality as the metaphor of new forms of managerial
control. Indeed, because trust no longer forms the basis of
professional ethics, such control is becoming necessary [see
also [80, 81]. Codd [79: 48] sees the introduction of such
instruments and institutions as an expression of “policies of
distrust”. Münch [81: 75] also observes that the new gover-
nance model “replaces trust with fundamental mistrust.” He
goes on to say that bureaucratic regulations are ineffective and
expert autonomy is abused.
From a functional point of view, trust and mistrust are to be
regarded as equivalent i.e. as a solution for the problem of the
possibilities of communication, decision-making and action-
taking. This holds true even though the consequences of trust
and mistrust are different [1, 41: 85, 82: 290] and can only be
assessed as good or bad by their results. Both trust and
mistrust are seen as an expression of a “committed attitude”
[83], which only makes sense when in connection with the
aim to which the actor aspires. The abstract aim of both trust
and mistrust consists in reducing the complexity of the social
situations resulting from (reflexive) ignorance. Both achieve
this by disregarding ignorance. However, mistrust blocks
interaction. When this happens people may perhaps look for
further information for confirmation, which in turn leads to
further blocks. Regarding the organisations responsible for
those checks and controls which are trusted, the “amount” of
trust they receive depends on their functionality: “Well-func-
tioning institutions need little trust for their stability, while
malfunctioning ones need a lot of trust in order to survive”6
[82: 286].
In the face of the “evident” shortcomings of the education
system, it seems that the education system will require a great
deal of trust for its survival. What is apparent though, is an
ongoing fundamental restructuring of the education system
according to the demands of economic rationality. This
restructuring finds expression, for example, in the evidence-
based, performance-oriented target agreements and in the
allocation of resources.
Can this, besides the introduction of monitoring instru-
ments, be taken as a further indication of declining trust in
the education system? Again with Lepsius, this question must
be answered in the affirmative. This is because the existing
rules and procedures seem to be regarded as ineffective –
otherwise there would be no need for restructuring: “Trust in
institutions reaches its breaking-point when the rules and
procedures that give structure and control to their actions are
no longer deemed efficient” [82: 288]. Hence, ongoing re-
forms can be interpreted as expressions of perceived
inefficiency. They are constantly addressed by new measures,
instruments and rules. However, there is a tendency for re-
forms to always call for further reforms [84], thereby fostering
complexity. As a consequence, the initiated continuity of
reforms makes it very difficult to follow up with communica-
tion that is inherent to the system. The result of this could be
that the system’s very existence might even be called into
question [85].
Trust and mistrust as two independent phenomena:
the coexistence of trust and mistrust
Trust and mistrust may also be regarded as phenomena that
occur more or less independently of each other. Hence, it can
be assumed that it may be possible to find that trust and
mistrust exist at the same time. This would be the case, for
example, if an actor were to have little trust in an institution’s
services, but might have trust in one specific representative, a
personal “face” of this institution [6], e.g. a teacher or princi-
pal. In such a case it is a different kind of trust. Some authors
call the trust in institutions that is based on the trust in their
representatives’ ethical trust. While trust in institutions is
focused (rationally) on whether the rules and regulations of
these institutions are followed, ethical trust has a habitual
anchor and is fed by the perception of trustworthiness. This
perception goes beyond the present moment taking place.
Starting from the interpretation that an erosion of trust in
public institutions is occurring, it is also conceivable that
rational trust is decreasing, while ethical trust as a further
component of trust in institutions remains stable. It is just as
conceivable that while rational trust in institutions turns into
mistrust, ethical trust remains as it is. Furthermore, present
dealings with these institutions need not be affected by this
mistrust. This is why an assumed shift towards mistrust can
hardly be recorded in a methodical and controlled way.
From this point of view the diagnosis of the erosion of trust
is therefore also a question of the choice of the segment under
observation. If the focus is on rational trust in institutions and
the measured trust is shrinking, it seems reasonable to interpret
this as erosion of trust. Moreover, it is safe to assume that the
original trust is now being replaced by mistrust. On the other
hand, it can also be assumed that it is the chosen focus of
observation that leads to the conclusion that an erosion of trust
is occurring. It is also conceivable that trust is shifting away
from institutions as the object of trust and towards the instru-
ments institutions use to give proof of their legitimacy. In this
case trust still exists in the system, but it is directed towards
alternative elements. This scenario and conclusion is sug-
gested by both Luhmann and Lepsius. Lepsius [82: 290], for
example, emphasises that mistrust in institutions is not neces-
sarily an indication of their weaknesses. Luhmann [1: 56]
states that trust in systems also includes trust in their immanent
checks and control: “Checks and control must be … moved6 This and the following quotes of Lepsius [82] are our own translations.
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into the trust-seeking systems and must be made explicit, or
even be organised there”. Thus, if an erosion of trust has been
attested in the education system, checks and control must be
installed in order to regain trust or at least to reduce mistrust.
This is currently being done through the implementation of
new governance instruments in the sense of the “institution-
alizing of mistrust” [ibid.: 118]. The necessary condition to
fulfil this function is that the instruments of institutionalized
mistrust – in this case the instruments for generating knowl-
edge about education – are trusted themselves. This leads to
our thesis that trust is shifted from the organizations and expert
systems to the instruments of institutionalized mistrust trying
to observe them.
Shifting of trust in institutions towards trust in instruments
and the methodological consequences for the observation
of these instruments
From the perspective of trust theory, the thesis can be proposed
that: in the course of the newly ignited discussion about the
methods of gaining insight and knowledge that are appropriate
to the research object, there is an apparent shift of trust. This
shift is, namely,towards the methods and instruments. If, for
example, due to negative reports on the capability of the
education system, there is cause for trust to be diminished, it
seems reasonable that there is a solution to regain or stabilize
the now damaged trust. Because trust has been withdrawn
scepticism exists regarding the capability of institutions (e.g.,
concerning the observation of regulations designed to ensure
the capability), it seems reasonable that the observation of
regulations as well as the performance of institutions should
be checked. For this, appropriate instruments need to be intro-
duced. But the instruments, or rather their performance, must
also be trusted if they are to fulfil their function. In the discus-
sion about suitable methods and the establishment of organi-
sations meant to regulate the application of governance-gener-
ating instruments it becomes clear that the focus of trust can
shift. That is to say the focus shifts from trust in institutions to
trust in instruments, and therein institutions reveal that they
mistrust [54, 86]. As has also been shown, the precondition of
trust in more abstract performance structures requires that these
structures are reified [1: 29]. Some participants in the critical
debate on “measuring” education see this real representation of
empirical research of education as a reduction of education to
something that can be measured and quantified [87]. It is said
that in this way something is being installed which
Angermüller [65], (with reference to Foucault’s thoughts about
governmentality), calls “numerocratic regimes”. Such regimes
are characterized by the fact that the perception, thinking and
actions of actors are governed in such a way that perpetual self-
regulation and optimization is taking place. This self-realiza-
tion is transpiring through the orientation on numbers, statis-
tics, or rankings. Parallel to the introduction of new governance
models, a turning towards extensive government practices
(with their accompanying continuous build-up of new gover-
nance models) can be also observed in the area of education.
This is especially visible in those society formations which
show an affirmed, accelerated transition to the knowledge-
based society [79, 81, 88]. This argument is embedded in the
critical review of government models that act in such a neo-
liberal way.
Accepted evidence
Instead of discussing the criticism of a neoliberal
governmentality we will discuss the specific form of regula-
tive knowledge generation that is connected with it. This is
because what is regarded as “evident” primarily results from
systematic research from controlled studies favouring the
“predominance of one certain method” [45: 70]. Evidence
gathered outside these “certain methods” (e.g. experimental
control group designs in empirical-quantitative education re-
search or indicator research on the macro-level) remains
“disregarded from the start or is excommunicated” (ibid.). In
this way, knowledge gained and legitimized by means of a
limited repertoire of scientific methods becomes a scarce good
that not is not accessible to everybody, as Schäfer and Thomp-
son [26: 12 f.] assume.7 It is not only that due to this selective
prioritization of methods that the battle of about methods
(assumed to that everybody thought have been overcome)
might flare up again. There is also “the real danger that the
debate (about the interrelation between empirical findings,
research, politics and practice) might lead to a contemporary
renewal of those ‘paradigm wars’. To be sure, such arguments
which had hindered forestalled a meaningful discussion about
education research for decades” [92: 269 f.]. Furthermore,
there is the worry that the methodological question of how
to measure education will dominate over the questions about
the aims and purpose of education. Furthermore, this would be
done without approaching, reflecting on and discussing the
methodological form of measuring education itself as specif-
ically and making it accessible to designing access to the
world [26, 93: 545 ff.]. However, whether the assumption of
such a shift of trust will be confirmed is also an empirical
question which will have to be solved by future research.
Summary and outlook on perspectives of future research
on trust
This article has confronted the question of trust in the knowl-
edge-based society. The first issue presented in this was that in
7 See also the debate on the relationship between education theory and
(empirical) education research, e.g. in Zierer [87]; Tenorth [89, 90];
Stojanov [91]).
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the knowledge-based society ignorance must also be taken
into account. Against this background, trust was introduced as
a phenomenon which plays a central role in dealing with
ignorance in terms of maintaining decision-making and ac-
tion-taking capabilities. Because of its contingent complexity,
it reduces the increasing uncertainty found in social situations
in the knowledge-based society because of its contingent
complexity, which is increasing in the knowledge-based soci-
ety. In the face of the reported diminished trust in public
institutions, which has been reported in numerous surveys,
there has been a theoretical discussion on trust in the organi-
sations of the education system has arisen. Trust is a multi-
dimensional phenomenon which is cognitively and emotion-
ally sound and relevant to behaviour. In this paper, the focus
has been on the cognitive dimension of trust, within so far as
the introduction of instruments of knowledge-based gover-
nance as the central point has been in the centre of attention.
Beside the temporal and social functions of trust, a particular
focus was on the factual dimension of trust, namely the issue
of the introduction of evidence-based governance. In this
respect we have worked out that in the face of negative
education assessment results of education assessments and
often correspondingly negative news reports, concentrating
just on shortcomings, trust in the education system has been
diminished. Although not yet empirically confirmed sound
yet, this assumption is plausible. This is due to the perception
of the background that the recent introduction of evidence-
based governance instruments can be regarded as an institu-
tionalizing of mistrust. The purpose of this introduction of
such instruments which is meant to serve to regain trust.
We have further worked out that the introduction of such
instruments increases the lack of transparency in the system.
This opaque quality is the very reason why it cannot help
regain trust. This increase in complexity is typical for the
knowledge-based society, is plausible in our point of view.
This is because the talk about evidence-based governance
draws on a generative metaphor. This serves as a social-
technological means of translation to link various subsystems.
What remains open, however, is the relationship between trust
and mistrust. On this matter we have discussed three perspec-
tives in which trust and mistrust can be regarded as being
either in a mutually exclusive relationship or in a complemen-
tary one. By assuming that there may be a shift from trust in
organisations and actors to trust in instruments we have placed
a third perspective opposite the first two. The opportunity to
regain lost trust, created by institutionalizing mistrust in the
education system through introducing instruments of new
governance, which at the same time limits the control thus
established, will only last as long as trust in the instruments is
ensured. This opens up perspectives for future research on
trust in the field of education. In our opinion, this is where the
theoretical, empirical as well as application-oriented potentials
of trust research in the social sciences.
The theoretical as well as empirical task that arises is to
shed light on animating the relationship between trust and
mistrust in modern society. The increasing social complexity,
as evident in the education system enforces the dependence on
expert knowledge. In turn it is met with increasing scepticism
due to easier access to knowledge and the growing lack of
clarity about the sources of knowledge. In our opinion having
trust in the education system or its capability is essential seems
to us to be essential to have trust in the education system or its
capability, because the education system is the prerequisite for
the future workforce [94: 320]. Questions that need to be
resolved are, for example: What can more likely replace lack
of knowledge – rational, ethical or emotion-based trust?
Which factors contribute to making trust vulnerable and mis-
trust more stable? How can valid records be made of the
multiple dimensions of trust beyond measuring attitudes and
how can the action-relevance of trust be evaluated? What
replaces trust that has eroded? Does trust really erode or does
it rather shift, so that the focus of social-scientific research
must be newly adjusted? What is the connection between
perceived risks, trust and mistrust? How can the object of trust
be determined and how can the risk be determined that this
object will be exposed to? If one takes into account that trust is
by origin functional or rests on a habitual foundation, only
becoming reflexive when damaged, how can this be done in a
methodologically controlled way?, if one takes into account
that trust is by origin functional or rests on a habitual founda-
tion and only becomes reflexive when it is damaged? It is at
this point then the question as to when trust is converted into
hope will have to be resolved. Does this transition constitute
an improvement? Or rather another level of deterioration,
specifically when no longer knowledge but solely faith alone
forms the basis for further communication, actions and
decisions?
Finally one could reflect on whether there may be equiva-
lent mechanisms in the system of education to the ones in the
business world that provide insurance coverage of trust such
as it is made possible by insurance agencies. In that case, it is
neither knowledge nor faith, but the weighing up and calcu-
lation of possible futures on the base on monetary consider-
ations that will form the decisive foundation for complexity
reduction. This will be done by transposing the danger of loss
into the comparison between the risk of loss and a possibly
bad investment in insurance. In that case, the worry about the
future is not resolved in trust but in insurance [95]. Can we
expect a similar mechanism in the education system in the
course of further mechanisation? Indeed, such a mechanism
would allow decisions to be made in the present independent-
ly of trust while simultaneously they also ensure that decisions
can be made in the future.
Rising successfully to these theoretical as well as empirical
challenges might also bring an application-related benefit. If
there are soundly established measures of building trust in
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institutions, decisions, instruments, people or the like, one
could think about creating suitable communication strategies.
They might, if necessary, ensure that changes in the structure
of organisations and other controlling bodies made through
the use of instruments have a neutral effect on trust.
Since futures research is concerned with the investigation
of conceivable, desirable and feasible futures, research on
integrating trust or disintegrating mistrust fits very well into
the spectrum of its relevant and innovative research topics of
research.
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